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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
In re Suarez'
(decided June 3, 2008)
Santos Suarez stabbed Jovana Gonzalez, his live-in girlfriend,
in the throat, chest, and abdomen, and fled the scene without sum-
moning assistance while she bled to death.2 Suarez was found six
days later in Rhode Island, where he told police officers that he
slapped Gonzalez during an argument; that Gonzalez pulled a knife
on him; and that with the knife in hand, she scratched his chest.
3
Suarez claimed he retrieved the knife from her, lunged at her, and
fled once he realized she was bleeding from her neck. 4 Thus, a ques-
tion of "[w]hether he intended to kill her or merely to cause her seri-
ous injury" arose.'
Suarez was charged with second-degree murder, first-degree
manslaughter, and fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon.
6
At trial, Suarez raised the defense of justification and extreme emo-
tional disturbance ("EED"), which resulted in the trial judge submit-
ting the following four crimes, in order, for the jury to consider: "in-
tentional murder, first-degree manslaughter (intentional murder
reduced by virtue of an EED), depraved indifference murder, and
1 890 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 2008).
2 Id. at 203.
3 People v. Suarez, 844 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2005).
4 id.
' Id. at 732.
6 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 203.
1
Makembe: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2009
TOURO LA WREVIEW
first-degree manslaughter (intentional manslaughter)."7 The jury was
instructed of New York's "acquit first" rule in which a jury must ac-
quit or convict the defendant on each count in the order of their ver-
dict sheet. 8 Therefore, first, the jury was to decide whether the de-
fendant was guilty of intentional murder. If the jury found him
guilty, then they were to move on to consider his defense of EED. If
they acquitted him of intentional murder, then they must move on to
consider depraved indifference murder, and so forth. The judge made
it very clear that once they found him guilty of one count they must
"[s]top and go no further." 9 The jury was firmly instructed that they
were not to consider first-degree manslaughter unless they first ac-
quitted Suarez of depraved indifference murder.'0 The jury acquitted
Suarez of intentional murder, after which they considered depraved
indifference.' The jury found Suarez guilty of depraved indifference
murder, and accordingly, the judge requested that they affirm their
verdict and neglect to consider the last count of first-degree man-
slaughter. 12
Suarez appealed, contending that his conviction was legally
insufficient because his conduct was "intentional and therefore could
not have been reckless."'' 3 However, the Appellate Division, First
7 id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
'0 Id. at 204.
" Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 204.
12 Id. at 204-05.
13 Id. at 205. A person commits depraved indifference murder when "[u]nder circum-
stances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engaged in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of an-
other person." Suarez, 844 N.E.2d at 726 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (2) (McKinney
1262 [Vol. 25
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Department upheld the trial court's conviction, stating that a reason-
able jury could have found that Suarez's conduct satisfied the ele-
ments of depraved indifference murder. 14 Subsequently, the Court of
Appeals reversed Suarez's conviction and held that Suarez's actions,
as a matter of law, did not meet the elements required to satisfy a
conviction of depraved indifference murder. 5 The court remitted
back to the appellate division to address: "whether, given [Suarez's]
acquittal of intentional murder and the Court of Appeals' reversal of
[his] conviction of depraved indifference murder, the Double Jeop-
ardy Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions,... bar [Suarez]
from now being tried for intentional manslaughter in the first de-
gree.' 6
On remittitur, the appellate division held that the Double
Jeopardy Clauses under the United States Constitution, 17 and the New
York State Constitution, 8 did not bar the prosecution from retrying
Suarez for first-degree manslaughter, also known as intentional man-
slaughter. 19 The appellate division reasoned that because of the "ac-
quit first" rule, the jury never reached the charge of intentional man-
slaughter, which was included in the original indictment.2" But for
the trial judge's erroneous instruction on depraved indifference, the
2008)).
14 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 205.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 205-06.
17 U.S. CONST. amend V, states, in pertinent part: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
18 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "[n]o person shall be subject to be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense."
19 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d. at 206.
20 Id.
2009] 1263
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jury would have been given a full opportunity to deliberate on the
charge of intentional manslaughter. 21  The court reasoned that the
outcome at trial was similar to a mistral situation, and because a ver-
dict on the charge of manslaughter one was not rendered, a future
prosecution on that charge was permissible.22
Suarez appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that Suarez "may be reprosecuted for intentional manslaughter., 2
3
First, the court reasoned that the situation was similar to a mistrial.2 4
Accordingly, a retrial of Suarez will unquestionably include the iden-
tical offense of the first trial: first-degree manslaughter. However,
even though "the jury was charged with intentional manslaughter in
the first trial, [it] did not have a full opportunity to consider it."
25
Therefore, constitutional double jeopardy was not an obstacle to re-
trying Suarez for manslaughter in the first degree.26 In addition, the
court noted that "[t]he major justification for permitting a retrial after
... a[n] appellate reversal of a conviction is. . . 'the practical impor-
tance of preventing every trial defect from conferring immunity upon
the accused.' ,27
Secondly, the "Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second
trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insuffi-
21 Id.
22 Id. (quoting People v. Suarez, 832 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007)).
23 Id. at 203.
24 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 211.
25 Id. at 212.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 211 (quoting James F. Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be Irrelevant: Government
Overreaching as a Bar to Re-Prosecution Under the Double Jeopardy Clause After Oregon
v. Kennedy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 76, 87-88 (1983)).
1264 [Vol. 25
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cient. ''28 As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that Suarez "is
to be retried for intentional manslaughter, not depraved indifference
murder, the only count [this court] reversed for evidentiary insuffi-
ciency., 29 On appeal, the court concluded that as a matter of law, the
evidence was insufficient to convict Suarez for depraved indiffer-
ence; since he was acquitted by the jury for intentional murder, he
may not be retried for this crime either.3°
Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Suarez's claim that
the jury necessarily had implicitly acquitted him of intentional man-
slaughter as a result of finding him guilty of depraved indifference
murder.31 The court concluded that in this case there is "no basis for
implying an acquittal from silence, because the instruction forced the
jury to resolve the counts in a particular order and to cease delibera-
tions upon finding Suarez guilty." 32 Also, "implied acquittal presup-
poses that the first jury 'was given a full opportunity to return a ver-
dict' on the charge at issue, and that did not happen" in Suarez.33
Further, the court concluded that "two mental states are not
mutually exclusive when applied to different outcomes. 34  There-
fore, Suarez's first conviction for "depraved indifference murder
would not be inconsistent with a subsequent conviction for inten-
tional manslaughter," because intentionally inflicting serious physical
28 United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
29 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 212.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 213.
33 Id. (qouting United States v. Green, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957)).
34 People v. Trappier, 660 N.E.2d 1131, 1132 (N.Y. 1995).
12652009]
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injury could apply to a separate outcome. 35 The court determined that
Suarez "could have recklessly caused a grave risk of death while in-
tentionally inflicting serious physical injury.,
36
In practice, protections under the New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law double jeopardy jurisprudence parallels and vitalizes the
traditional federal approach under the United States Constitution.
Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
Double Jeopardy Clause establishes the fundamental principle that a
person cannot be tried twice for the same crime.37 In Blockburger v.
United States,38 the Supreme Court concluded that to establish that a
single act constitutes one or two statutory offenses depends on
whether one offense requires proof of an element in which the other
does not.39 "The petitioner was charged with violating provisions of
the Harrison Narcotic Act," because of alleged sales of morphine hy-
drochloride to the same purchaser. 40 The jury returned a verdict con-
victing the petitioner for the second, third and fifth counts of his in-
dictment.41 The convictions included the sale of ten grains of a drug
on one day and eight grains on the following day, in which the latter
35 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 214.
36 Id.
37 Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88.
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.
Id.
38 284 U.S. 299 (1984).
'9 Id. at 304.
40 Id. at 300.
41 Id. at 301.
1266 [Vol. 25
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was not in compliance with statutory provisions.4 2
The petitioner argued that
(1)... upon the facts, the two sales charged in the sec-
ond and third counts as having been made to the same
person, constitute a single offense; [and the second
and third counts were to the same purchaser, which
constitutes a single offense]; and (2) that the sale
charged in the third count as having been made not
from the original stamped package, and the same sale
charged in the fifth count as having been made not in
pursuance of a written order of the purchaser, consti-
tute but one offense for which only a single penalty
lawfully may be imposed.43
The Court held that the contentions were unsound because the
distinctions between the offenses were clear under the Narcotic Act. 4
The successive sale of drugs constitutes a distinct and separate of-
fense, no matter how closely they may follow each other.45 Each
transaction created a separate offense which required the proof of dif-
ferent elements.46 In addition, prosecution of one offense is not
barred by acquittal or conviction of another offense when the defen-
dant's single act is applicable to two separate offenses.47
In Ball v. United States,48 the Supreme Court held that "a gen-
eral verdict of acquittal upon the issue of not guilty to an indictment
undertaking to charge murder ... is a bar to a second indictment for
42 Id.
43 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301.
44 Id. at 302.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 304.
47 Id. at 304 (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 433 (1871)).
48 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
2009] 1267
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the same killing. 4 9  In Ball, three defendants were charged with
murder, to which they all plead not guilty.50 At trial, the jury found
defendant Ball not guilty, but found the other two defendants guilty
as charged.5 Ball was discharged and the other two defendants were
committed to county jail but appealed their convictions.52 The Court,
on writ of error, found that the indictment was "fatally defective, and
would not support a sentence for murder" because the indictments
never stated where and when the victim died.53 The Court reversed
the judgments against the two defendants and remanded the case with
directions to amend the indictment.54
However, the prosecution again charged all three defendants
with the corrected indictment for murder.55 Ball moved to dismiss
the new indictment because of double jeopardy concerns since he was
formally acquitted.56 The trial court overruled Ball's plea, and the
jury in the second trial found all three defendants guilty.57 On appeal,
the Supreme Court reasoned that as long as a court had jurisdiction
over the claim and the party, a jury's verdict could not be held void,
but only voidable.58 The trial jury acquitted Ball, which means he
had the right to enjoy the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
He could not be deprived of this right because of the other defen-
41 Id. at 669.
50 Id. at 663.
51 Id. at 663-64.
52 Ball, 163 U.S. at 664.
53 ld.
54 Id.
" Id. at 665.
56 Id.
17 Ball, 163 U.S. at 665-66.
18 id. at 669-70.
1268 [Vol. 25
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dants' appeal and writ of error which only applied to them.5 9 The
Court concluded that the acquittal was final, and reprosecution would
violate the Constitution by putting the defendant twice in jeopardy.
60
In United States v. Green,61 the Supreme Court held that the
petitioner, in his second trial for first-degree murder, was placed in
"jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the Constitu-
tion., 62 In Green, the defendant was indicted on two counts of arson
and murder in the first degree.63 After the presentation of evidence
concluded, the trial judge instructed the jury that they could find the
petitioner guilty of arson and of either murder in the first degree or
second degree. 64 The jury found Green guilty of arson and second-
degree murder.65 The jury was silent on the charge of first-degree
murder.66  Green appealed his conviction of second-degree murder
and the Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded be-
cause, in light of the evidence, the charge of second-degree murder
should have never been submitted to the jury.67 On remand, the
" Id. at 670.
60 Id. at671.
61 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
62 Id. at 190.
63 Id. at 185.
64 Id.
The trial judge treated second degree murder, which is defined by the
District Code as the killing of another with malice aforethought and is
punishable by imprisonment for a term of years or for life, as an offense
included within in the language charging first degree murder in the sec-
ond count of the indictment.
Id.
65 Id. at 186.
66 Green, 355 U.S. at 186.
67 Id. There was ample evidence in the record to show that the victim's death was caused
by the fire. If the defendant was found to have committed arson which resulted in the death
of the victim, then under the D.C. criminal code, the defendant could be found guilty of first
degree murder alone. The elements of second degree murder are not relevant to the facts pre-
2009] 1269
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prosecution indicted the petitioner under the original indictment for
arson and first-degree murder.68 Green raised the defense of former
jeopardy, but the court overruled his plea and the second jury found
Green guilty of arson and first-degree murder. 69 On appeal, the court
of appeals affirmed.7 °
The Supreme Court reviewed Green's claim and cited the Ball
Court, stating that the "prohibition is not against being twice pun-
ished, but against being twice put in jeopardy; and the accused,
whether convicted or acquitted, is equally put in jeopardy at the first
trial., 71 The Court noted that a verdict of guilt or innocence is not es-
sential for the protection of jeopardy to commence.72 A defendant
cannot be tried again after he has been tried by a jury and the jury has
been discharged of their duty without offending the principles of
jeopardy.73 The jury was given a full opportunity to return a verdict,
but was discharged without rendering a verdict as to first-degree mur-
der and without Green's consent. 74 Green's jeopardy attached for
first-degree murder when the jury was discharged, and thus he could
not be retried for that offense.75
Further, the argument that the petitioner voluntarily "waived"
sented at trial. U.S. v. Green, 218 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 186.
71 Green, 355 U.S. at 186 n.5 (citing Ball, 163 U.S. at 669).
72 Id. at 188 (stating that once a defendant has been put "to trial before a jury so that if the
jury is discharged without his consent he cannot be tried again"). The Court also noted that
"jeopardy is not regarded as having to come to an end so as to bar a second trial in those
cases where 'unforeseeable circumstances ... making [the] completion [of trial] impossible.'
"Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 190-191.
71 Id. at 191.
[Vol. 251270
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his plea of former jeopardy when he appealed to have his conviction
set aside is "wholly fictional. 76 It is fictional to assume that the peti-
tioner chose "to forego his constitutional defense of former jeopardy
on a charge of murder in the first degree in order to secure a reversal
of an erroneous conviction of [a] lesser offense., 77 The law does not
intend to deny a prisoner of his constitutional protection of jeopardy
just so that he may appeal his conviction for error.78
In United States v. Burks,79 the Supreme Court held that the
"Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of af-
fording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which
it failed to muster in the first proceeding." 80 The Court clarified the
effect of jeopardy in an appellate reversal of a conviction due to in-
sufficient evidence and trial error. In Burks, the defendant was tried
for "robbing a federally insured bank by use of a dangerous
weapon." 8 ' As a defense, Burks claimed insanity, and produced three
expert witnesses who testified that he suffered from mental illness at
the time of the robbery and was substantially incapable of conform-
ing to the law.82 The government produced two experts who claimed
that the defendant suffered from a character disorder and was not
mentally ill.83 One expert gave ambiguous testimony as to Burks'
ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and the
76 Green, at 191-92.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 192.
79 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
80 Id. at 11.
81 Id. at 2.
82 Id. at 2-3.
83 Id. at 3.
2009] 1271
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other testified that Burks was capable of functioning normally.8 4
Burks moved for a judgment of acquittal, but the trial court denied
his motion and the "jury found Burks guilty as charged., 85 Burks
moved for a new trial, "maintaining . . . '[the] evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the verdict,' "but the motion was denied.86
On appeal, the "Court of Appeals [Sixth Circuit] agreed with
petitioner's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the
verdict and reversed his conviction. ' '8 7 The court of appeals reasoned
that the government did not meet its burden of proving sanity beyond
a reasonable doubt.88 Since Burks had requested a new trial at the
close of his original trial, the court "remanded to the District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee "for a determination of whether
a directed verdict of acquittal should be entered or a new trial or-
dered." 89 Burks appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that a second
trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.90
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Ap-
peals' decision represented a resolution that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the conviction. 9' The decision was analogous to the
court determining that the district court "erred in failing to grant a
judgment of acquittal. 9 2 Distinguishable from Ball, the Burks' Court
found that a new trial was needed to rectify trial error. " 'The princi-
84 Burks, 437 U.S. at 3.
85 Id.
86 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
87 Id.
81 Id. at 3-4.
'9 Burks, 437 U.S. at 4 (internal quotations omitted).
90 Id. at 5.
9' Id. at 10.
92 Id. at 11.
1272 [Vol. 25
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pie that [the Double Jeopardy Clause] does not preclude the Govern-
ment's retrying a defendant whose conviction is a set aside because
of an error in the proceedings leading to a conviction is well-
established part of our constitutional jurisprudence.' ,93
The New York Constitution prescribes the same protections
as the federal government, that "[n]o person shall be subject to be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 94 Analogous to protec-
tions of the United States Constitution, the New York Constitution
and the New York legislature established common law and statutory
provisions that vitalize federal jeopardy jurisprudence.95 New York
Criminal Procedure Law section 40.20 prohibits "[a] person [from
being] separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon the the
same act or criminal transaction., 96 When an offense requires the
proof of an element or proof of a fact that the other does not, then
they are not considered the same offense for double jeopardy pur-
poses.97
In People v. Biggs,98 the Court of Appeals held that the "dis-
missal of a count due to insufficient evidence is tantamount to an ac-
quittal ... and protects a defendant against additional prosecution." 99
In Biggs, the defendant was originally indicted of murder in the first
degree, murder in the second degree, consisting of both intentional
murder and depraved indifference murder, and criminal possession of
93 Id. at 14 (citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964)).
94 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6.
95 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 40.20 (McKinney 2008).
96 Id. § 40.20 (2).
97 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
9' 803 N.E.2d 370 (N.Y. 2003).
99 Id. at 372.
2009] 1273
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a weapon. 00 The court refused to submit the charge of intentional
murder to the jury because of insufficient evidence and only submit-
ted the two counts of second-degree depraved indifference murder
and two counts of second-degree manslaughter.' 0' The jury found the
defendant not guilty of murder but was unable to return a verdict on
the manslaughter charges, which resulted in a mistrial. 0 2 In his sec-
ond trial, the defendant was indictedon on two counts of manslaugh-
ter in the first and second degrees.'0 3 Although the defendant moved
to dismiss the charges on first-degree manslaughter as unauthorized
under double jeopardy, the court denied his motion stating that the
first jury had not considered this charge under the original indict-
ment.10 4 The second jury returned a guilty verdict for manslaughter in
the first degree and, as advised, never reached the issue of man-
slaughter in the second degree. 5 The Appellate Division, Second
Department affirmed.1
0 6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals stated that the dismissal of
the counts of intentional murder due to insufficient evidence had the
effect of an acquittal. 10 7 Further, the court emphasized that the issue
of double jeopardy rests on whether the determination of the judge
was a resolution of the factual elements that constituted an acquittal
'00 Id. at 371.
"02 Id. at 371-72.
102 Id. at 372.
103 Biggs, 803 N.E.2d at 372.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 id.
107 Id. at 372-73.
[Vol. 251274
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of the offense. l08 In addition, applying the traditional federal Block-
burger same elements test, the court concluded that the lesser offense
of first-degree manslaughter required no proof beyond that which is
required for the conviction of intentional murder in the second de-
gree.' O9 Therefore, the two crimes are the "same offense" and "pre-
cluded defendant's subsequent indictment and prosecution for first-
degree manslaughter."
'1 10
In People v. Mayo, ll ' the Court of Appeals held that "the trial
court's decision to withdraw a first degree robbery count ... on the
ground of insufficient evidence was equivalent to an acquittal and
therefore operated as a bar to any further prosecution of that
charge."' 12 In Mayo, the defendant was charged with a single count
of first-degree robbery.1 13 However, the trial court removed the count
from the jury's consideration because of insufficient evidence.1 14 The
defendant moved to dismiss the charges, but the judge refused to
completely dismiss the indictment and indicated to the jury that they
may only consider the lesser charges of second- and third-degree rob-
bery. 115 Ultimately, there was a mistrial, and the prosecutors in the
second trial elected to charge the defendant under the original indict-
ment of first-degree robbery. 1 6 During the second trial, the jury was
108 Biggs, 803 N.E.2d at 373 (citing Unites States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564, 571 (1977)).
'09 Id. at 374.
"0 Id.
Il 397 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1979).
112 Id. at 1168.
ll Id. at 1167.
114 Id. at 1167-168.
115 id.
116 Mayo, 397 N.E.2d at 1168.
2009] 1275
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once again instructed not to consider the charge of first-degree rob-
bery, and it returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of second-
degree robbery." 7 The Appellate Division, Third Department "de-
termined that the trial court had erred in permitting the defendant to
be tried a second time for first degree robbery," but that it was harm-
less error.
1 8
The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the defendant's
rights had been violated under the Double Jeopardy Clause, but dis-
agreed that it was harmless error. 1 9 The court determined that an in-
dictment charging the defendant of second- and third-degree robbery
would have been proper under the principles of double jeopardy. 2 °
The first court's determination that the first-degree robbery count was
insufficiently supported by evidence was sufficient to place the de-
fendant in jeopardy. Although the jury was not given an opportunity
to fully consider the crime of first-degree robbery, the court implic-
itly acquitted him of this charge. 21 Lastly, the court concluded that
the traditional "harmless error" approach could not apply because the
mere charge to the jury is more than likely to have prejudiced the de-
fendant in the second trial.'22
In People v. Robinson, 23 the Fourth Department held that a
defendant could not be convicted of both manslaughter, which re-
quires intent to cause serious physical injury, and ... depraved mind
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1169.
121 Mayo, 397 N.E.2d at 1169.
122 Id. at 1170.
123 538 N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1989).
1276 [Vol. 25
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murder, which requires recklessness, at the same time. 124 In Robin-
son, the defendant was charged with "intentional murder in the sec-
ond degree and depraved indifference murder in the second de-
gree." 125 The defendant allegedly "punched and kicked the victim
into a state of unconsciousness, bound him with electrical cord,
transported him to a public park and abandoned him there on the
snow-covered ground," where the victim died of hypothermia. 26 The
trial judge did not charge the jury with the counts in the alternative,
and the jury found the "defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first
degree . . . and also found him guilty of depraved mind murder."
127
On appeal, the Fourth Department concluded that the "two second
degree murder counts charged in the indictment are inconsistent
counts" and may be submitted to the jury only in the alternative in a
single homicide charge. 28 Subsequently, the case was reversed and a
new trial was granted only on the count of depraved mind murder be-
cause the jury had previously acquitted him of intentional murder in
the second degree.1
29
In contrast, in People v. Trappier,'30 the Court of Appeals
held that "two mental states are not mutually exclusive when applied
to different outcomes."'' 3' In Trappier, the defendant was indicted for
"attempted murder in the second degree,... attempted assault in the
124 Id. at 123.
125 Id. at 122.
126 Id.
127 id.
128 Robinson, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
129 Id.
31 660N.E.2d 1131 (N.Y. 1995).
"'1 Id. at 1132.
2009] 1277
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first degree,.... criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree
.. . and reckless endangerment in the first degree." 132 Following a
dispute with the victim, Trappier fired three shots in the victim's di-
rection, hitting the victim's pant leg, with another bullet going past
the victim's ear. 133 The attempted assault charge required proof of
specific intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim, and the
reckless endangerment count required proof of recklessly creating a
grave risk of death to the victim. 134 Trappier was "acquitted of at-
tempted second degree murder but convicted of the remaining
counts."' 135 Trappier moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that he
had been "found . . . guilty of acting both recklessly and intention-
ally," which were inconsistent states of mind. 136 The trial court re-
jected the defendant's motion, but on appeal the conviction for at-
tempted assault and reckless endangerment were reversed as legally
inconsistent counts. 1
37
The Court of Appeals found that the defendant could have in-
tended "one result-serious physical injury-while recklessly creating a
grave risk that a different, more serious result--death-would ensue
from his actions."'138 The jury's finding of specific intent to cause se-
rious physical injury did not necessarily negate a finding of reckless
endangerment because the counts contain two separate results. 139 The
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
131 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1133.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1133-134.
139 Id. at 1134.
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
court noted that this decision was not contrary to Robinson, because,
in that case, the defendant was "convicted for acting intentionally and
recklessly to the same result."
140
The New York Court of Appeals has "never suggested that
state constitutional double jeopardy protection differs from its federal
counterpart."' 14 1 The double jeopardy clauses under both the New
York State and Federal constitutions provide nearly identical protec-
tions. 142 Under federal and state interpretations, it is well established
that the double jeopardy protection attaches after an appellate rever-
sal of conviction due to insufficient evidence. 43 The state legislature
has simply supported and reemphasized the federal protections of
double jeopardy.144 Further, New York's "acquit first" rule, which
requires juries to deliberate offenses in a decreasing order of culpabil-
ity, protects against double jeopardy. 145  When an appellate court
overturns a conviction because of legal insufficiency, the defendant
cannot be retried for counts that the jury has deliberated on and ren-
dered an acquittal. In New York, the defendant may only be retried
for the counts in which the juries were not given a full opportunity to
consider. 1
46
The right to a fair trial in criminal prosecutions is well settled
law under the Sixth Amendment. 147 When a verdict is not rendered
140 Trappier, 660 N.E.2d at 1134.
141 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 209.
142 Id.
14' Burks, 437 U.S. at 18; Biggs, 803 N.E.2d at 373.
144 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 209.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 U.S. CONST. amend VI, states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
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on the charge as a result of a mistrial or partial verdict, a retrial may
be ordered without offending the principles of double jeopardy.
148
The right to a retrial serves the interests of both the defendant and so-
ciety. 149 However, alongside a criminal defendant's right to a fair
trial is society's interest in punishing criminals who have been given
a fair trial and clearly found guilty under the law.1 50 The New York
Court of Appeals evaluates factors of fairness before subjecting the
defendant to re-prosecution, even if double jeopardy technically has
not attached.' 5' Alternatively, a judge's decision to bar re-
prosecution will not be justified squarely on the interest of fairness
and inconvenience to the defendant.1 52 Although the defendant is en-
titled to fairness, the notion of fairness would not justify an awkward
or expansive alternative to a retrial of the case. 53 The result of a mis-
trial, due to a substantive or procedural defect, shall neither bar
reprosecution nor confer immunity on the accused.
54
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cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district where in the crime shall have been committed."
141 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 206.
149 Id. at 208 (citing, United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)).
150 Id.
151 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 213.
152 George C. Thomas, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY 255 (New York University
Press) (1998).
153 id.
154 Suarez, 890 N.E.2d at 211.
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RIGHT TO NOTICE
United States Constitution Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall.., be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation....
New York Constitution article I, section 6:
[T]he party accused.., shall be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation ....
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